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The 1957 and 1968 influenza pandemics, each of which 
killed ≈1 million persons, arose through reassortment events. 
Influenza virus in humans and domestic animals could 
reassort and cause another pandemic. To identify geographic 
areas where agricultural production systems are conducive 
to reassortment, we fitted multivariate regression models 
to surveillance data on influenza A virus subtype H5N1 
among poultry in China and Egypt and subtype H3N2 among 
humans. We then applied the models across Asia and Egypt 
to predict where subtype H3N2 from humans and subtype 
H5N1 from birds overlap; this overlap serves as a proxy for 
co-infection and in vivo reassortment. For Asia, we refined the 
prioritization by identifying areas that also have high swine 
density. Potential geographic foci of reassortment include 
the northern plains of India, coastal and central provinces 
of China, the western Korean Peninsula and southwestern 
Japan in Asia, and the Nile Delta in Egypt.
Simultaneous infection with multiple influenza virus strains can affect virus fitness components, such as vi-
rus growth performance, and thus affect virus pathogenic-
ity, transmission, or recombination (1). In a host infected 
with 2 closely related influenza viruses, the stains can re-
assort, exchanging gene segments to produce new strains, 
some of which might have increased virulence. Virulence 
might also trade off with transmission such that more patho-
genic viruses spread more slowly (2). However, in some 
instances, a reassortant virus can have high transmissibility 
and high pathogenicity. For example, reassortment between 
influenza viruses of humans and birds resulted in the 1957 
and 1968 pandemic viruses, each of which is estimated to 
have killed ≈1 million persons (3,4). The exchange of genes 
between pairs of influenza virus subtypes increased viru-
lence in animal models, including reassortment between 
subtypes H9N2 and H1N1, between H5N1 and H1N1, and 
between H3N2 and H5N1 (5,6). We focus on reassortment 
between subtypes H3N2 and H5N1 because extensive data 
are available, but given sufficient data, our approach could 
be extended to other subtypes.
For seasonal influenza virus A subtype H3N2, 
person-to-person transmissibility and prevalence among 
humans are high (7). Furthermore, subtype H5N1, which 
is primarily found in birds, can be highly pathogenic; the 
fatality rate among humans is 60% (8). In mice, ≈8% of 
reassortant viruses formed from human subtype H3N2 and 
avian subtype H5N1 resulted in increased virulence and a 
mortality rate of 100% (5). This finding among mice raises 
the possibility that among humans reassortment events 
between subtypes H3N2 and H5N1 could generate a novel 
influenza virus that could spread rapidly, resulting in many 
deaths. To prioritize areas where future reassortment is 
most likely to occur, we analyzed surveillance data for 
subtype H5N1 among poultry in the People’s Republic 
of China and Egypt and subtype H3N2 among humans. 
We chose China and Egypt because both countries have 
had recent outbreaks of subtype H5N1 infection among 
poultry, human deaths from subtype H5N1 infection, and 
extensive spatial data on cases of infection with subtype 
H5N1. This information would help decision makers 
implement policies to reduce spillover in these areas (9). 
Areas with high risk for co-occurrence of these 2 influenza 
virus subtypes along with high densities of susceptible 
hosts, such as swine, quail, or turkeys, could benefit from 
enhanced monitoring and farm and market biosecurity.
Materials and Methods
Influenza Data
Egypt
All data for Egypt were aggregated to the scale 
of the markaz, an administrative district that includes 
several villages. The dataset for subtype H5N1 infections 
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during 2009–2012 consisted of 453 cases among poultry 
in backyard flocks, farms, and live-bird markets in 35 
markazes. Screening assays are described elsewhere (10). 
See online Technical Appendix Figure 1, wwwnc.cdc.gov/
EID/article/19/4/12-0903-Techapp1.pdf, for a workflow 
analysis. Most (72%) positive samples came from chickens 
in backyard flocks. The available geographic data on subtype 
H3N2 in Egypt are limited (online Technical Appendix Table 
3), so we used human population density as a surrogate for 
cases of infection with subtype H3N2 because virtually all 
humans (except those who have been vaccinated or infected 
recently) will be susceptible to infection with subtype H3N2.
China
All data for China were aggregated to the spatial scale 
of the prefecture, an administrative unit within a province 
that typically contains several towns and villages. We 
examined 2 independent datasets for cases of subtype H5N1 
infection on the basis of outbreaks on poultry farms and 
active surveillance of live-bird markets (11). The data on 
cases of subtype H3N2 infection were retrieved by querying 
GenBank and the EpiFlu database available from the Global 
Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) website 
(http://platform.gisaid.org) for all occurrences of subtype 
H3N2 in China that included fine-scale geographic data on 
the prefecture in which the sample was collected (online 
Technical Appendix Table 1). Data on subtype H3N2 cases 
were available for 35 prefectures and comprised 632 human 
cases collected over 14 years. However these data are limited 
because in a typical influenza year in China, hundreds of 
millions of cases might occur. Therefore, we also compared 
the GenBank and GISAID data on subtype H3N2 cases with 
human population density, assuming that the density is a 
proxy for the true number of subtype H3N2 cases.
Ecologic Variables
Subtype H3N2
For China, we predicted the probability of occurrence 
of subtype H3N2 cases by using environmental factors 
hypothesized in previous studies to be major drivers of 
human influenza: human population density, percentage 
urban area, precipitation, and temperature (online Technical 
Appendix Table 2). For instance, we incorporated 
population into the model because we hypothesized that 
human influenza cases would be more likely to occur in 
high-density urban areas with a large number of susceptible 
human hosts (12). For Egypt, we used human population 
density as a proxy for subtype H3N2 infections.
Subtype H5N1
To predict occurrence of subtype H5N1 cases, we 
used the following as environmental covariates: chicken 
and duck density, human population density, percentage 
of each prefecture occupied by bodies of water, and 
percentage of cultivated cropland per prefecture or markaz 
(online Technical Appendix Table 2). These variables were 
included because results of previous studies have associated 
them with risk for subtype H5N1 (11,13,14). For example, 
human population was included as a predictor of subtype 
H5N1 because it serves as an indirect measure of intensity 
of poultry trade (15). For Egypt, we used overall poultry 
density because density of chickens and ducks separately 
was not available.
Swine Density
To identify potential areas of influenza reassortment, 
we refined the co-occurrence maps by also incorporating 
swine density. We used density data from the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, which 
constructed these data by extrapolating from agricultural 
censuses and livestock surveys by using regression models 
(16). The rationale was to focus on areas where subtypes 
H3N2 and H5N1 might exchange genes in livestock 
because swine support co-infections with multiple lineages 
of the influenza virus, which occasionally generate novel 
strains (17,18).
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Figure 1. Potential influenza reassortment areas in Egypt. Districts 
in red are predicted to have an above average number of cases 
of influenza subtype H5N1 virus in poultry and an above average 
human population density, which is a proxy for subtype H3N2 virus 
infections.
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Statistical Models
Egypt
We constructed a Poisson regression model in which 
the dependent variable represents the count of a rare 
event. The dependent variable was the number of cases 
of subtype H5N1 in poultry per district. The independent 
variables were poultry density, human population density, 
percentage cropland, and percentage water per district. 
The dataset included sites where poultry were negative for 
subtype H5N1. We identified districts predicted to have an 
above average number of cases of subtype H5N1 among 
poultry and above average human population density. Such 
districts could be the site of double infections with subtypes 
H3N2 and H5N1 in humans and of in vivo reassortment.
China
We used multivariate logistic regression to 
relate occurrence of subtypes H3N2 and H5N1 to the 
aforementioned ecologic variables (online Technical 
Appendix Table 2). The logistic regression models were 
built by using population density, percentage urban area, 
temperature, and precipitation as predictors of subtype H3N2 
presence and chicken and duck density, human population 
density, percentage cropland per prefecture, and percentage 
water as predictors of subtype H5N1 presence. The datasets 
comprise occurrences of subtypes H5N1 or H3N2 but lack 
negative occurrences. Therefore, we selected negative sites 
at random and then fitted a logistic regression model to the 
positive and random negative occurrences. To reduce the bias 
of random negative occurrences, we selected negative sites at 
random 10,000× and calculated the average of the parameters 
of the logistic regression model over these randomizations.
Results
Egypt
Areas with a high number of cases of subtype H5N1 
in poultry and high human population density, which we 
used as a surrogate for subtype H3N2 infections in humans, 
were located in the Nile Valley and Delta in Lower Egypt 
(Figure 1). These areas could be sites of human co-infection 
with subtypes H3N2 and H5N1, leading to the evolution 
of novel influenza strains. Major cities located within 10 
km of potential reassortment hotspots are Benha, Cairo, 
Dumyat, El Faiyum, and Shibin el Kom, which could be 
prioritized for increased surveillance to detect reassortment 
events and prevent spread. Poultry density per district was 
a highly statistically significant predictor of subtype H5N1 
in poultry (Table), probably because high bird densities 
facilitate transmission of the virus among flocks in a 
village. The percentage of cropland per district was highly 
correlated with poultry density (ρ = 0.72), so we included 
only the latter in the regression model. The percentage 
of water per district also approached significance, which 
could be because family compounds in rural areas where 
backyard flocks are raised are typically located near canals 
and irrigated fields.
China
Cases of subtype H3N2 in humans in China were 
mostly concentrated along the east coast (online Technical 
Appendix Figure 2, panel A). The association between 
subtype H3N2 and human population density was 
significant (Table). Human population density, climate, and 
the percentage of urban areas per prefecture collectively 
explained ≈60% of the risk for subtype H3N2 occurrence 
(R2 = 0.596, area under the curve [AUC] = 0.902). Subtype 
H3N2 is expected to occur primarily in central, eastern, and 
southern China (online Technical Appendix Figure 2, panel 
B). In the surveillance and the outbreak datasets, statistically 
significant drivers of subtype H5N1 occurrences were 
human population, duck density, and percentage of water. 
The models for subtype H5N1 had moderate predictive 
power (R2 surveillance = 0.604, AUC surveillance = 0.918, 
R2 outbreak = 0.424, AUC outbreak = 0.848).
After creating maps of the probability of occurrence of 
subtypes H3N2 and H5N1, we multiplied the maps by one 
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Figure 2. Influenza empirical data and occurrence maps for influenza virus subtypes H3N2 and H5N1. A) Observed cases of subtypes 
H3N2 and H5N1 in People’s Republic of China, according to outbreaks reported to the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture. B) Spatial model of 
the probability of subtype H3N2 at the prefecture scale predicted by using logistic regression. C) Risk for subtype H5N1 according to the 
outbreak dataset. See online Technical Appendix Figure 2, wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/19/4/12-0903-Techapp1.pdf, for the corresponding 
map for the surveillance dataset.
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another to predict the probability of co-occurrence of the 
2 subtypes (Figure 3, panel B; online Technical Appendix 
Figure 3, panel B). We classified an area as a potential 
reassortment hotspot if the probability of both subtypes 
occurring at the site was >50% and the density of swine was 
above average. Analysis of other swine density thresholds 
yielded similar results. The consensus of the spatial models 
(Figure 3, panel C; online Technical Appendix Figure 3, 
panel C) is that in China, there are 2 main geographic foci 
of risk for reassortment of subtypes H3N2 and H5N1: 1) the 
coastal provinces bordering the South China Sea and East 
China Sea (Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Zhejiang 
Provinces) and 2) central China (Hunan and Sichuan 
Provinces). The added value of modeling areas where 
subtypes H3N2 and H5N1 co-occur versus modeling based 
exclusively on subtype H5N1 is that the former approach 
pinpoints a smaller geographic region that can be prioritized 
for increased surveillance or farm biosafety. Mapping areas 
based on the probability of subtype H5N1 occurrence alone 
would prioritize additional provinces to the southwest 
(Henan, Hebei, and Hubei) and to the north (Beijing, Hebei, 
Liaoning, and Tianjin) of the 6 provinces that we identified as 
potential areas for reassortment between subtypes H3N2 and 
H5N1 (Figure 2, panel C; online Technical Appendix Figure 
2, panel C). Our prioritization of a smaller geographic area 
is valuable if the resources for surveillance are insufficient 
to enable sampling of all of the provinces that are at risk for 
subtype H5N1.
East Asia
We applied the influenza virus subtypes H3N2 and 
H5N1 logistic regression models that were fitted to the data 
from China to neighboring countries for which chicken and 
duck density data were available (19). As in the analysis for 
China, we multiplied the subtype H3N2 and H5N1 models 
to predict areas of co-occurrence between the subtypes 
and overlaid swine density. To the extent that these areas 
have above average swine density and a >50% chance for 
co-occurrence of subtypes H3N2 and H5N1, potential 
reassortment hotspots are the northern plains of India (Uttar 
Pradesh), the western Korean Peninsula (Daejeon, Gyeonggi, 
Jeollabuk Provinces of South Korea and Pyonganbuk and 
Pyongannam Provinces of North Korea), and southwestern 
Japan (Saga Prefecture on Kyushu Island) (Figure 4, panel 
B; Technical Appendix Figure 4, panel B). Major cities with 
>500,000 persons near these hotspots include Kanpur, India; 
Chengdu, Sichuan, central China; Hangzhou and Shanghai, 
eastern China; and Seoul, South Korea. Risk is higher in these 
cities because they have high densities of swine, which could 
be a mixing vessel for reassortment of subtypes H5N1 and 
H3N2, and a high potential for infection with subtype H5N1 
and H3N2 according to our regression models; for example, 
the models indicate that the ecologic suitability of Shanghai 
is 0.97 for subtype H3N2 and 0.996 for subtype H5N1. 
Incorporating population density as a proxy for infection 
with subtype H3N2 results in predictions that are compatible 
with the models based on swine density but also identifies 2 
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Table. Effect of environmental variables on occurrence of influenza virus subtypes* 
Location, subtype (data source) Coefficient SE p value 
China    
 Subtype H3N2     
  Intercept 5.184 0.946 8.7 × 108 
  Human population 9.47 × 104 3.23 × 104 4.47 × 102 
  Percentage urban 0.113 0.117 0.284 
  Precipitation 4.59 × 103 8.87 × 103 0.573 
  Temperature 1.24 × 102 8.27 × 103 0.195 
 Subtype H5N1 (surveillance dataset)    
  Intercept 7.93 1.66 3.01 × 105 
  Chicken density 6.94 × 102 0.438 0.572 
  Duck density 1.53 0.433 3.45 × 103 
  Human population 1.41 × 103 2.85 × 104 1.77 × 104 
  Percentage agriculture 2.18 × 104 1.52 × 104 0.218 
  Percentage water 7.32 × 102 1.7 × 102 2.36 × 103 
 Subtype H5N1 (outbreak dataset)    
  Intercept 9.24 1.14 3.15 × 1012 
  Chicken density 1.24 0.277 2.87 × 104 
  Duck density 0.542 0.24 0.117 
  Human population 1.37 × 103 2.67 × 104 1.41 × 103 
  Percentage agriculture 2.13 × 104 8.84 × 105 5.4 × 102 
  Percentage water 0.101 1.91 × 102 4.53 × 103 
Egypt    
 Subtype H5N1     
  Intercept 1.83 0.516 4 × 104 
  Poultry density 7.86 × 104 2.31 × 104 7 × 104 
  Human population 3.36 × 102 6.49 × 102 0.605 
  Percentage water 0.752 0.41 6.64 × 102 
*Boldface indicates p<0.05. 
 
Hotspots for Influenza Virus Reassortment
other megacities of >10 million persons that could be at high 
risk for virus reassortment: Dhaka, Bangladesh and Delhi, 
India (Figure 4, panel C; online Technical Appendix Figure 
4, panel C).
Discussion
The spatial models presented here predict that a 
reassortant influenza (H3N2/H5N1) virus is most likely to 
originate in the coastal and central provinces of China or the 
Nile Delta region of Egypt. The probability that subtypes 
H3N2 and H5N1 will co-occur in these regions is high 
(Figure 1; Figure 3, panel C; online Technical Appendix 
Figure 4, panel C), which could lead to dual infection in 
mammalian hosts, such as swine or humans in China or 
humans in Egypt. Co-infection could subsequently result 
in in vivo reassortment. Although the influenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 virus is hypothesized to have originated from 
Mexico (20), southern China remains a major hotspot for 
the generation of novel influenza viruses (21). Our spatial 
models are compatible with this longstanding observation 
insofar as we predict that the southern coastal province of 
Guangdong is a potential hotspot for the evolution of novel 
influenza viruses by reassortment.
A caveat is that even if virus subtypes H3N2 and H5N1 
were to reassort in swine, the spread of the reassortant 
virus among humans might require further virus adaptation 
events; for example, mutations might be required for the 
virus to replicate efficiently in humans or to be transmitted 
among humans (22). Recent work has shown that as few as 
5 aa substitutions are required for aerosol spread of subtype 
H5N1 among mammals (23). With these qualifications in 
mind, this analysis provides actionable recommendations 
about which areas to target for intensified farm and 
market surveillance. Such surveillance could enable early 
detection of a reassortant influenza (H3N2/H5N1) virus, 
should it arise in swine, and facilitate containment of the 
virus before it crosses the species barrier to humans.
Our finding that in China the probability of subtype 
H3N2 infection increases with human population density 
is compatible with previous studies that detected a positive 
association between population, influenza cases, and 
mortality rates (12,24). Reasons for this association could be 
that the number of susceptible human hosts increases with 
population (11) or that surveillance efforts are greater in 
populous areas (25). Our results with regard to subtype H5N1 
in birds are also largely consistent with those of previous 
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Figure 3. Potential influenza reassortment areas in People’s Republic of China determined by using the influenza virus subtype H5N1 
outbreak dataset. A) Density of swine. B) Spatial model of the risk for subtype H3N2 and H5N1 co-occurrence according to the outbreak 
dataset. C) Areas with a probability of subtype H5N1 and H3N2 co-occurrence >50% and above average swine density. D) Areas with a 
probability of subtype H5N1 and H3N2 co-occurrence >50% and above average human population density. See online Technical Appendix 
Figure 3, wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/19/4/12-0903-Techapp1.pdf, for corresponding maps based on the subtype H5N1 surveillance dataset.
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studies that mapped subtype H5N1 hotspots in China and 
Egypt. In China, several provinces identified as having high 
ecologic suitability for subtype H5N1 (including Shandong, 
Jiangsu, and Sichuan) were also identified as subtype H5N1 
hotspots in a previous study that used a different statistical 
model and different predictor variables (11). In China, 
previous analyses have concluded that risk for subtype H5N1 
increases with the density of domestic ducks (26). In Egypt, 
earlier studies identified high-intensity crop production as a 
statistically significant predictor of subtype H5N1 in poultry 
(27). Similarly, we found that subtype H5N1 infections in 
poultry were associated with poultry density, which was 
highly correlated with crop production. In a previous study, 
models constructed from satellite images of vegetation 
predicted that the highest environmental suitability for 
subtype H5N1 is along the Nile River and in the Nile Delta 
(28). Our models were constructed from different predictor 
variables, such as poultry density, but yielded similar results: 
the highest number of subtype H5N1 cases in poultry were 
predicted to occur in districts in the Nile Delta.
Efforts to contain the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus would 
have been more effective if the virus had been detected 
in animal populations before it was transmitted to 
humans (29). Continuous zoonotic influenza surveillance 
is needed in China and Egypt and requires a network of 
laboratories to screen surveillance samples and requires 
financial incentives to encourage poultry producers and 
sellers to report outbreaks. One strategy for early detection 
of a reassortant virus could involve increasing farm and 
market surveillance in the identified areas (i.e., live-bird 
markets in 6 provinces in China [Guangdong, Hunan, 
Jiangsu, Shanghai, Sichuan, and Zhejiang] that have a 
>50% chance of subtype H3N2 and H5N1 co-occurrence 
and above average swine density). Increased monitoring 
could identify hotspots where subtype H5N1 is circulating, 
leading to more efficient targeted vaccination of poultry, 
and could pinpoint prefectures at high risk for a reassortant 
virus. In China, sanitary practices, such as cage disinfection 
and manure disposal, would substantially reduce risk for 
subtype H5N1 in live-bird markets (30).
In Egypt, our results support increased surveillance of 
backyard flocks near Benha, Cairo, Dumyat, El Faiyum, 
Shibin el Kom, and Tanta, where suitability for subtypes 
H5N1 and H3N2 is predicted to be high. Control measures 
could include compensation plans and vaccination of poultry 
with a recently developed subtype H5N1 vaccine that is more 
effective than previous vaccines against strains circulating in 
Egypt (10). Reporting of poultry disease outbreaks in Lower 
Egypt is poor (31), probably because farmers fear loss of 
income if authorities cull their flocks. Indeed, birds suspected 
to be infected with subtype H5N1 are often sold quickly at 
a discount, resulting in virus transmission to buyers’ flocks 
and families (32). If equitable compensation schemes were 
implemented, reporting of subtype H5N1 might increase 
and outbreaks could be contained more quickly, reducing 
opportunities for subtypes H5N1 and H3N2 to co-infect 
humans or domestic animals and, thus, for reassortment.
In general, policies such as culling must have a 
scientific basis because these measures have major effects 
on the economy and animal welfare. For example, when 
part of a swine herd is culled to contain an outbreak, it might 
become necessary to euthanize the entire herd, including 
animals with no influenza exposure, because buyers will not 
accept them (33). Furthermore, influenza outbreaks among 
livestock can trigger major global declines in meat prices, 
and the nature and timing of veterinary health authorities’ 
responses to an outbreak can affect the extent to which 
demand recovers after the crisis. In particular, when control 
measures such as culling are scientifically well justified and 
explained to the public soon after the start of an outbreak, 
consumer confidence is restored more quickly (34).
Although our maps suggest a risk for reassortment 
in Lower Egypt and eastern and central China, in vivo 
reassortment of subtypes H3N2 and H5N1 has not been 
detected in humans in these areas. On the other hand, 
numerous infections with influenza (H3N2)v, a reassortant 
virus that contains genes from a subtype H3N2 virus 
circulating in swine and from the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, 
have been detected in humans in North America (35,36). 
This finding raises the question of why subtype H3N2v 
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Figure 4. Reassortment areas elsewhere in Asia based on the People’s Republic of China model constructed from the influenza virus 
subtype H5N1 outbreak dataset. A) Probability of subtype H3N2 and H5N1 co-occurrence (according to the subtype H5N1 outbreak 
dataset). B) Areas with a probability of subtype H5N1 and H3N2 co-occurrence >50% and above average swine density. C) Areas with a 
probability of subtype H5N1 and H3N2 co-occurrence >50% and above average human population density. See online Technical Appendix 
Figure 4, wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/19/4/12-0903-Techapp1.pdf, for corresponding models based on the surveillance dataset.
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has spread but subtype H3N2/H5N1 reassortants have not. 
Spread of subtype H3N2v could result from the fact that the 
reassortant virus contains the M gene from the A(H1N1)
pdm09 virus, which increases aerosol transmission (35,37). 
Our models might explain why, in contrast with subtype 
H3N2v reassortants, no subtype H3N2/H5N1 reassortants 
have been detected in humans. For example, we predict 
that subtypes H3N2 and H5N1 occur in Hunan, China, a 
province that has high swine density and was the geographic 
origin of subtype H5N1 viruses in clade 2.1 (38). Influenza 
(H3N2/H5N1) reassortants in which the nonstructural gene 
comes from a clade 2.1 virus replicate poorly in mice (5). 
Thus, subtype H3N2/H5N1 reassortants might not have 
emerged as often as subtype H3N2v reassortants because the 
provinces where subtypes H3N2 and H5N1 overlap contain 
a clade of subtype H5N1, whose genes reduce the fitness of 
reassortant viruses. If this hypothesis is correct, if subtypes 
H5N1 and H3N2 infect a pig in central China and exchange 
genes, the hybrid virus might not replicate efficiently or 
transmit to other hosts. Furthermore, a reassortant virus 
with surface proteins similar to those of subtype H3N2 
viruses that have circulated in humans recently might have 
poor transmissibility because of preexisting immunity (18).
Applying our modeling framework to other zoonotic 
influenza subtypes, such as H3N2v, could yield insight 
about geographic hotspots of reassortment and the pattern 
of spatial spread of reassortants. To accomplish this, 2 data 
limitations must be overcome. First, to be incorporated into 
spatial models, influenza sequences submitted to GenBank 
or GISAID should be accompanied by geographic data at 
relatively high spatial resolution, for example, names of 
cities or counties where sampling was conducted. However, 
such sequences are often accompanied by only the state or 
country of the sample, which reduces the usefulness of 
the data for fine-scale spatial modeling (39). For example, 
we searched online databases and confirmed that the 
geographic data available for Indonesia are insufficient to 
construct a spatial model to predict sites with a high risk 
for reassortment. Second, more extensive surveillance of 
livestock is needed to provide sufficient sample sizes to 
parameterize geographic models. Currently, the number of 
influenza subtype H1, H3, and H5 viruses from swine in 
major databases is an order of magnitude lower than that 
available for humans (online Technical Appendix Table 
3). Additional surveillance of swine could lead to better 
predictions about hotspots of influenza in livestock and 
sites of potential swine-to-human transmission. Livestock 
surveillance campaigns should sample large geographic 
areas and include regions where production is high (35). 
The potential for reassortment between human and 
avian influenza viruses underscores the value of a One 
Health approach that recognizes that emerging diseases 
arise at the convergence of the human and animal domains 
(29,40). Although our analysis focused on the influenza 
virus, our modeling framework can be generalized to 
characterize other potential emerging infectious diseases at 
the human–animal interface.
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